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Professor John Harrison’s The Political Question Doctrines flags several
interesting dynamics in the federal courts’ treatment of the doctrine. He claims
that the Supreme Court has actually applied the political question doctrine in
only two situations—where it has found final decision-making authority in a
non-judicial actor and where it has sought to avoid the issuance of prospective
relief that intrudes too much upon the policy-making authority of other actors.
He notes that the Court has never actually held that the doctrine is a limit on
its subject matter jurisdiction and contends that lower courts, which have
applied the doctrine in other contexts and routinely dismissed for want of subject
matter jurisdiction, have strayed too far afield. This Response examines these
points in turn and concludes that, while Professor Harrison’s characterization
of the Supreme Court’s holdings is descriptively accurate, scattered tea leaves in
dicta and separate opinions may give reason for skepticism that the Court has
proceeded with a method to its madness.
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INTRODUCTION
Professor John Harrison’s The Political Question Doctrines1 finds
troubling disconnect between the Supreme Court’s treatment of the
political question doctrine and the way that many lower federal courts
are applying it.2 The Supreme Court, by his reckoning, has employed
the doctrine in two discrete contexts.3 First, the Court has invoked the
political question doctrine where the Constitution confers final
decision-making authority on a non-judicial entity.4 In these cases,
which arise rarely, the Court has treated the determination of the nonjudicial entity as conclusive and controlling and adjudicated the case
on that understanding.5 Second, and relatedly, the Court has used the
doctrine to sidestep the issuance of prospective relief that would
trench too much on non-judicial decision-making.6 In neither of these
situations, Professor Harrison claims, has the Court expressly
grounded the political question doctrine in Article III, and it follows
that in neither has it actually held that the political question doctrine
is a restriction on courts’ subject matter jurisdiction—sporadic dicta to
the contrary notwithstanding.7
Lower courts, according to Professor Harrison, have strayed from
this orderly course in two key respects.8 First, and perhaps most
fundamentally, they have not asked the right questions.9 Instead of
examining whether the actors from a coordinate branch have final,
and thus conclusive, decision-making authority, they have asked merely
whether these other actors possess discretion.10 That non-judicial
actors have discretion, of course, does not mean that such discretion is
boundless. Professor Harrison suggests that lower courts have
abdicated in important respects by seeing invocation of the political
question doctrine as the norm, rather than as a rare exception.11
Second, lower courts have on several occasions dismissed for want of
1. John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457 (2017).
2. See id. at 512–13, 517–20, 528.
3. See id. at 460 (dividing the Supreme Court’s political question jurisprudence
into non-judicial finality cases and cases dealing with prospective remedies).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 460–61, 468–70, 476–77, 481 (discussing the types of non-judicial finality cases).
6. See id. at 481–85.
7. See id. at 496–97.
8. See id. at 518–20.
9. See id. at 518.
10. See id. (explaining that the lower courts have misunderstood Baker and “routinely fail
to recognize that the political question doctrine mainly turns on non-judicial finality”).
11. See id.
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subject matter jurisdiction, when nothing in the Supreme Court’s
actual practice requires it.12 Professor Harrison thus finds considerable
over-application of the political question doctrine by lower federal
courts, and he contends that these dismissals permit lawlessness and
thwart accountability, particularly in the foreign affairs context.13
There is much to unpack in The Political Question Doctrines, and this
Response focuses in on three points: (1) the subdivision of the Supreme
Court’s political question applications into two branches, non-judicial
finality and limitations on prospective relief;14 (2) the claim that the
Supreme Court has never treated the political question doctrine as a
limitation on subject matter jurisdiction;15 and (3) the assumed
disconnect between the political question doctrine as the Supreme
Court sees it and the political question doctrine as it is playing out in
many lower federal courts.16
I. THE TWO BRANCHES
The political question doctrine had its origins in Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison,17 which explained that certain
executive acts are by their nature political and answerable by means of
political processes, rather than by judicial examination.18 Nearly half a
century later, the Court sidestepped a feud between rival Rhode Island
governments, holding that Congress, not the courts, had power to
recognize the legitimacy of a state government.19 The Supreme Court
has deployed the doctrine on only very few occasions since, leaving
scholars and lower courts with scattered tea leaves to guess at its scope

12. See id. at 520.
13. See id. at 527–28.
14. See infra Section I and accompanying text.
15. See infra Section II and accompanying text.
16. See infra Section III and accompanying text.
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18. See id. at 166.
19. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). Although some read
Luther expansively to suggest that Guarantee Clause claims present non-justiciable
political questions, any suggestion of that broad holding in the case was dicta because
plaintiffs had not challenged the government under that constitutional provision. See
Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1908, 1928 (2015). The Court did not definitively establish the non-justiciability of
Guarantee Clause claims until 1912 in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon.
See 223 U.S. 118, 149 (1912).
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or theoretical provenance.20 In a famous back-and-forth, Professors
Wechsler and Bickel debated whether the doctrine ought to be
invoked only in the rare case of a demonstrable textual commitment of
exclusive authority to another branch—the Wechsler view21—or oftemployed whenever, in their discretion, judges believe that expedience
or concern for institutional legitimacy might require it—the Bickelian
counterargument.22 The six factors laid out in Baker v. Carr23 incorporated
elements of each of these seemingly opposed views, leaving subsequent
courts no clear roadmap as to how or on what basis to proceed.24 In his
seminal article, Is There a ‘Political Question’ Doctrine?,25 Professor Louis
Henkin questioned the existence of a separate political question

20. See generally Grove, supra note 19, at 1910 (noting that scholars “have strongly
disputed the nature, scope, and wisdom of the doctrine”); J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense
of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 99 (1988) (noting broad
disagreement over whether the doctrine exists at all or whether it exists but should not).
Many commentators have attempted to slice and dice the doctrine into component
parts. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 247–63 (2002)
(describing development of Wechsler’s “classical” and Bickel’s “prudential” formulations
of the doctrine); Chris Michel, Comment, There’s No Such Thing as a Political Question of
Statutory Interpretation: The Implications of Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 123 YALE L.J. 253, 255–
56 (2013) (discussing coalescence of political questions into “two primary categories”
of textually demonstrable commitments to other branches and claims that lack
judicially manageable standards).
21. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1959).
22. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term–Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961); see also Barkow, supra note 20, at 261–62
(describing Bickel’s belief in the benefits of the “prudential political question doctrine”).
23. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The six factors are: (1) “a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”; (2) “a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it”; (3) “the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion”; (4) “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government”; (5) “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made”; and (6) “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Id.
24. See Zivotofsky ex rel. v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189, 202 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (observing that “the
proper application of Baker’s six factors has generated substantial confusion in the lower
courts”); see also Mulhern, supra note 20, at 163 (arguing that the criteria in Baker “seem
hopelessly inadequate for the task of distinguishing between cases courts should dismiss
on political question grounds and cases for which judicial review is routine”).
25. Louis Henkin, Is There a ‘Political Question’ Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
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doctrine at all.26 He noted that prior cases had not, in fact, given
“extra-ordinary deference” to political branches but rather had asked
whether the political branches had acted within approved boundaries
and in abidance with prescribed limits.27 The vacillating fortunes of the
political question doctrine have led some commentators to declare the
doctrine dead;28 others, however, fervently insist that it lives on.29
Given the murky and contested underpinnings of the doctrine, at
least as applied to constitutional questions, it seems at first blush
surprising when Professor Harrison labels the Supreme Court’s political
question cases “orderly,”30 but he goes on to make a descriptive case.
He looks in depth at eight cases in which the Court refused to
adjudicate a constitutional question on the ground that it presented a
political question and calls six of them “non-judicial finality” cases31
and two of them cases in which the Court refused entry of prospective
relief that might intrude too much upon policy-making.32
The “non-judicial finality” cases that Harrison canvasses fit neatly
into his paradigm.33 Frequently, the Court has employed words either
26. See id. at 622.
27. Id. at 608.
28. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 20, at 240 (pointing out the recent “demise” of the
political question doctrine); Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested
Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1459 (2005) (noting, after Bush v. Gore, many scholars’
conclusions that the doctrine is in serious decline “if not fully expired”); Gwynne
Skinner, Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now Clearly Dead: The “Political Question
Doctrine” as a Justiciability Doctrine, 29 J.L. & POL. 427, 459 (2014) (noting that the
Court’s consistent recent rejection of the doctrine “raises significant questions about
whether the doctrine continues to exist at all”); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the
Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine,
80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1229 (2002) (finding significance in the Court’s failure to
consider the political question doctrine in Bush v. Gore).
29. See, e.g., Mulhern, supra note 20, at 162 (noting that the political question
doctrine’s critics “have failed to make out a case for abandoning the doctrine”); Note,
Political Questions, Public Rights, and Sovereign Immunity, 130 HARV. L. REV. 723, 726
(2016) (arguing that the classical political question doctrine articulates a principled
limit to judicial power).
30. See Harrison, supra note 1, at 458.
31. In addition to Luther, Harrison classifies the following cases as non-judicial
finality cases: Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405
U.S. 15 (1972); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Pacific States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); and Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
See Harrison, supra note 1, at 465–81.
32. Harrison classifies the following cases as remedy cases: Gilligan v. Morgan, 413
U.S. 1 (1973); and Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866). See Harrison,
supra note 1, at 481, 484.
33. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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suggesting exclusive power in congressional hands or underscoring
the absence of power in judicial hands.34 Thus, the Luther v. Borden35
Court stated that the right to decide which amongst two rival state
governments is established lies with Congress “and not in the courts.”36
In Field v. Clark,37 the Court refused a challenge to the mode of
enactment of a statute on the basis that “these and like matters were
left to the discretion of the respective houses of Congress.”38 The
Court in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon39 held that
Guarantee Clause claims are “solely committed by the Constitution to
the judgment of Congress.”40 Although Coleman v. Miller41 had no
majority opinion, the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes—for three—
that “ultimate authority” over ratifications rests with Congress,42 and
the concurring opinion of Justice Black—for four—that congressional
judgments are “conclusive upon the courts,”43 amply support the
classification. The Roudebush v. Hartke44 Court plainly stated that which
of two candidates may be seated in Congress is a question “that would
not have been the business of this Court.”45 Finally, in Nixon v. United
States,46 the Court found that the Constitution’s use of the word “sole”
vested in the Senate alone the authority to try impeachments and
deprived the judiciary of “any role.”47
So, too, the two cases cited for the proposition that the political
question doctrine has purchase when the Court is asked to grant
prospective relief that intrudes too much upon the policy-making
authority of other actors can fit within Professor Harrison’s descriptive
model. In Gilligan v. Morgan,48 the Court rejected the invitation to
wade into the business of training and controlling the National Guard

34. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 233; Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 19; Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450; Pac.
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 113; Field, 143 U.S. at 671; Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
35. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
36. Id. at 42.
37. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
38. Id. at 671.
39. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
40. Id. at 133.
41. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
42. Id. at 450.
43. Id. at 457 (Black, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
44. 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
45. Id. at 19.
46. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
47. Id. at 233–34.
48. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
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after the incident at Kent State University, finding such policy-making
decisions “subject always” to the “civilian control of the Legislative and
Executive branches.”49 In this respect, although the plaintiffs sought a
different remedy, the analysis in Gilligan may well have found a home
in the prior paragraph.50 The Court eschewed a role in making difficult
policy choices primarily because such choices were soundly within the
discretion of coordinate branches and not meted out to the judiciary by
the Constitution.51 Mississippi v. Johnson52 fits similarly into the “intrusive
prospective remedy” category, but it, too, focused in on the fact that
judges may not interfere “with the exercise of Executive discretion.”53
The two branches Professor Harrison identifies descriptively obviously
have a lot in common analytically. Both start with a presumed textual
commitment to non-judicial actors. The “non-judicial finality” cases
generally take a decision already rendered by a coordinate branch and
accept it as valid and binding.54 Implicitly, these cases find that the nonjudicial actors both have considerable discretion to act and have
worked within their prescribed boundaries.55 The “intrusive prospective
remedy” cases suggest that the judiciary should not jump into these
areas of considerable discretion and choose amongst policy options
better suited for a coordinate branch actor; they, too, leave open the
possibility of a judicial role if the coordinate branch actor ultimately
acts and transgresses its boundaries.56 At the end of the day, Professor
49. Id. at 10.
50. See id. at 11–12. Professor Henkin saw Gilligan as a proper exercise of equitable
discretion to withhold requested relief. See Henkin, supra note 25, at 621–22.
51. See Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10. As Professor Harrison notes, however, while the
Court was reluctant to enter injunctive relief, it permitted a damages action arising out
of the events at Kent State subsequently in Scheuer v. Rhodes. See Harrison, supra note
1, at 483 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)).
52. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
53. Id. at 499.
54. See supra notes 35–47 and accompanying text.
55. Although the majority opinion in Nixon viewed the Senate discretion to “try”
impeachments very broadly, Justice Souter’s concurrence in the judgment makes this
point concretely: while the Senate has authority, within “broad boundaries” that it did
not exceed in that case, to “try” impeachments, the Court could step in when the
Senate exceeded that authority, for example by employing a “coin toss.” Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253–54 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
The majority opinion is not inconsistent with this approach; it simply holds that the
Senate has unfettered discretion to define the word “try” and thus that the Senate did
not transgress any limits. See id. at 238.
56. See Harrison, supra note 1, at 482–83 (noting that, despite the Court’s
reluctance to enter prospective relief in Gilligan, the Court reserved the right to assess
unlawful military conduct in the context of a damages action).
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Harrison’s categories are descriptively accurate, and his atomistic
approach may be useful for his subsequent point about how the
conclusion of a political question has played out in the Supreme
Court.57 However, these two branches seem to be manifestations of a
consistent framework of judicial respect for discretion, coupled with
policing of the boundaries of that discretion.
It does bear mention, though, that a near-miss political question
holding might have presented challenges for Professor Harrison’s
orderly framework. In Goldwater v. Carter,58 Senator Barry Goldwater
challenged President Carter’s unilateral decision to recognize the
People’s Republic of China, which required nullification of the SinoAmerican Mutual Defense Treaty signed with Taiwan.59 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, heard argument, and issued a terse opinion
vacating and remanding with instructions to dismiss the complaint.60
Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist filed a statement concurring in the
judgment for himself and three other justices arguing that the case presented
a non-justiciable political question.61 There was no demonstrable textual
commitment of authority to a non-judicial actor; the Constitution was silent
as to which branch could abrogate a treaty.62 Despite this, Justice
Rehnquist claimed the delicate foreign affairs context called for
“political standards,” not judicial ones, and said the Court should not
set “in concrete” a resolution of the complicated question.63 Per Justice
Rehnquist, the appropriate action was to remand with instructions to
dismiss the complaint.64 He reasoned that “the political nature of the
questions presented should have precluded the lower courts from
considering or deciding the merits of the controversy.”65 This position
commanded four votes and elicited opposition in separate statements
by Justices Powell and Brennan. Justice Powell rejected application of
the political question doctrine because the Constitution had not
clearly committed treaty termination authority “to the President

57. See id. at 460.
58. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
59. The terse Supreme Court decision does not recount the facts, so this
background hails from the decision of the en banc court of appeals. See Goldwater v.
Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699–700 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc).
60. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996.
61. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
62. Id. at 1003.
63. Id. at 1003, 1004–05 n.1.
64. Id. at 1005–06.
65. Id. at 1006.

2018]

POLITICAL QUESTION DISCONNECTS

43

alone.”66 Justice Brennan, who reached the merits, charged Justice
Rehnquist with “profoundly misapprehend[ing] the political-question
principle as it applies to matters of foreign relations.”67
Obviously, a miss is as good as a mile, and Justice Rehnquist failed to
win that last vote. Still, the fact that four justices were prepared to sign
off on a conception of the political question doctrine that has seemingly
little to do with textually demonstrable “non-judicial finality” or “intrusive
prospective remedies” makes the doctrine seem a little less orderly, or at
least makes whatever order one can superimpose seem a little contingent.
II.

ARTICLE III ANTECEDENTS OF THE
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

A central thesis of Professor Harrison’s article is that the Supreme
Court has never regarded the political question doctrine as a limitation
on the jurisdiction of Article III courts.68 In “non-judicial finality”
cases, the Court has incorporated the non-judicial actor’s application
of law to fact into its decisions and adjudicated the cases on the
merits.69 For example, in Luther, the Court accepted the non-judicial
actor’s recognition of the legitimate Rhode Island government and
used that conclusion to reject the plaintiff’s claim for damages.70 In
prospective relief cases, the Court has exercised its equitable discretion to
withhold injunctive relief.71 In neither context has the Court remanded
with instructions to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction. This
is a complex and interesting point, and again, Professor Harrison may
be descriptively accurate that no Supreme Court case has actually held
that the political question doctrine has a grounding in Article III.72
Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist certainly intended to go there in
Goldwater v. Carter,73 but again, his opinion commanded only four votes.

66. Id. at 999 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. See Harrison, supra note 1, at 458.
69. See id. at 486–87.
70. Id. at 486; see also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 47 (1849).
71. See Harrison, supra note 1, at 487–92.
72. Id. at 486; see also Skinner, supra note 28, at 452 (explaining the Supreme Court
has “never found a case to be truly nonjusticiable based on the ‘political question
doctrine,’ and it certainly has never found an individual claim for damages
nonjusticiable under the doctrine”).
73. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1005–06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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Much turns on the distinction between holding and dicta, though,
and lower courts might be forgiven for their confusion on this
particular point. As recently as 2006, a unanimous Court stated that
“[t]he doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and political question all
originate in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language, no less than
standing does.”74 In that case, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,75 the Court
rejected the argument that a plaintiff who had standing with respect to
one claim could assert supplemental standing with respect to other,
closely related claims.76 The Court noted, in so doing, that the
plaintiff’s argument would have “remarkable implications”: if permitted,
“a federal court would be free to entertain moot or unripe claims, or
claims presenting a political question.”77 The DaimlerChrysler Court
cited Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee,78 which had grounded the
political question doctrine in Article III and stated that “the presence
of a political question suffices to prevent the power of the federal
judiciary from being invoked by the complaining party.”79 In Schlesinger,
the Court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs lacked standing kept it from
deciding the political question issue,80 so again, its treatment of the
political question doctrine was dictum.81 Schlesinger in turn cited Flast
v. Cohen,82 which described the Article III “case” or “controversy”
requirement as having “an iceberg quality,” containing “submerged
complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of
government.”83 “Thus,” the Flast Court continued, “no justiciable
controversy is presented when the parties seek adjudication of only a
political question.”84 In Sierra Club v. Morton,85 the Court indicated,
74. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).
75. 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
76. See id. at 352.
77. Id.
78. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
79. Id. at 215.
80. Id. at 215–16.
81. See id. at 214–16 (holding that the denial of standing “eliminate[d] the need
to consider” the political question issue).
82. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
83. Id. at 94.
84. Id. at 95. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the lower courts had concluded the
recognition issue raised a non-justiciable political question and dismissed for want of
subject matter jurisdiction. 566 U.S. 189, 193–94 (2012). The Supreme Court reversed
on the basis that the issue did not, in fact, raise a political question but did not take
issue with the lower courts’ assumption that political questions are nonjusticiable and
merit dismissal. See id. at 201–02.
85. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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again in passing, that resolution of political questions is “inconsistent
with the judicial function under Art. III.”86
Professor Harrison buttresses his point by noting that “the political
question doctrine generally applies in state court”87 and reasons that,
because state courts are not subject to the limitations of Article III, the
political question doctrine therefore must lack a basis in Article III.88
The Guarantee Clause cases certainly support the idea that such issues
are exclusively within Congress’s bailiwick and are unsuitable for
resolution in federal or state court.89 However, these cases lack much
by way of reasoning, and Justice Rehnquist’s plurality in Goldwater v.
Carter90 stated that “[t]his Court, of course, may not prohibit state
courts from deciding political questions, any more than it may prohibit
them from deciding questions that are moot . . . so long as they do not
trench upon exclusively federal questions of foreign policy.”91 It may
be that singular features of the Guarantee Clause cases—like the fact
that they represent challenges to the legitimacy of state government—
bring them within the ambit of “exclusively federal questions” like
those anticipated by Justice Rehnquist.92 Outside of the Guarantee
Clause context, there do not appear to be any cases that suggest or
assume that the political question doctrine binds state courts.93
At day’s end, Professor Harrison definitely has unearthed a
fascinating disconnect between what the Supreme Court has tended to

86. Id. at 732 n.3.
87. Harrison, supra note 1, at 497.
88. See id. (noting that state courts are barred from “interfer[ing] with the political
discretion of federal political actors,” even though they operate outside the
jurisdictional confines of Article III).
89. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
90. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
91. Id. at 1005 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
92. Id.
93. Some state courts have recognized a variant of the political question doctrine
in their own constitutions. See, e.g., Lobato v. Colorado, 218 P.3d 358, 368 (Colo. 2009)
(en banc) (recognizing political question doctrine as an emanation of the Colorado
Constitution). Several have employed the factors from Baker v. Carr to guide their
analysis under state law. See, e.g., Kansas Bldg. Indus. Workers Comp. Fund v. Kansas,
359 P.3d 33, 43 (Kan. 2015) (“[W]e will continue to view the political question
doctrine through Baker’s lens.”); Smigiel v. Franchot, 978 A.2d 687, 701 (Md. 2009)
(same). Others have expressly noted that the federal political question doctrine does
not bind them. See, e.g., Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 91 (Iowa
2014) (citing Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1005 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment)) (“It is important to note . . . that the United States Supreme Court has
made clear that the federal political question doctrine does not apply to state courts.”).
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say and what it has tended to do.94 The Court has repeatedly characterized
the political question doctrine as a species of justiciability doctrine and
has hinted, in so doing, that it, like standing or mootness, goes to subject
matter jurisdiction. And yet, in the limited data points in which at least
five members of the Court have actually found a political question, the
Court has not walked the walk.95 This insight is intriguing and brings
to mind Professor Henkin’s argument that the Court “needs no special
doctrine suggesting a quality of ‘nonjusticiability’” in this sphere.96
III.

LOWER COURTS

Given the Supreme Court’s confusing signals, both in what it has said
in dicta and in what four Justices were prepared to hold in Goldwater v.
Carter,97 a modicum of disarray in the lower federal courts is probably
unsurprising. Professor Harrison faults numerous decisions of the
courts of appeals for finding non-justiciable, and thereafter dismissing,
political questions where non-judicial actors simply have discretion,
not final decision-making authority.98 Whether there is disconnect,
obviously, turns on whether he is correct that the political question
doctrine has nothing to do with a federal court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.99 Descriptively, Professor Harrison certainly is right that
the courts of appeal routinely appear to dismiss for want of subject
matter jurisdiction and are very willing to invoke the political question
doctrine when a claim calls into question executive decision-making in
the foreign affairs context, without inquiring whether the executive
possesses final decision-making authority.100

94. See Harrison, supra note 1, at 458 (arguing that the Court has “often lost sight”
of its own “orderly” political question doctrine jurisprudence).
95. See id. at 486–92.
96. Henkin, supra note 25, at 599. At times, it is tempting to see the political question
doctrine as smoke and mirrors, its invocation nothing but a veiled merits determination
that another branch both has authority to decide and has not transgressed.
97. 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
98. See Harrison, supra note 1, at 518.
99. Id. at 528.
100. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (affirming dismissal of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act
after finding it would require court to assess merits of the executive’s decision to attack
a foreign target); Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271,
1280–83 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of action that might require review of
military supply decisions in wartime); Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 982, 984
(9th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal where action might undermine executive policy
choices in Israeli-Palestinian conflict).
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Is the Supreme Court likely to balk here? Zivotofsky I makes clear
that the Roberts Court takes the judicial role very seriously, even in an
area that touches upon foreign affairs.101 Zivotofsky I, though, presented
a conflict among coordinate branches as to which got to make a call; it
did not ask the Supreme Court to second-guess the call itself.102 One
wonders whether recent cases like Ziglar v. Abbasi103 may not signal that
the Supreme Court is increasingly comfortable sidelining itself where
suits ask courts to second-guess foreign policy determinations.104 In
Ziglar, the Court refused to permit a Bivens105 action by post-September
11 detainees because it would “require courts to interfere in an
intrusive way with sensitive functions of the Executive branch.”106
Neither the parties nor the Court mentioned the political question
doctrine. But the majority’s disinclination to permit a suit that
required review of the executive response to the war on terror at least
suggests that a majority of the current Court might be sympathetic to
the position of then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in Goldwater v. Carter.107
The Court seems all-too-willing to sanction roadblocks to suits in the
foreign affairs context,108 and Ziglar suggests a basis for skepticism that a
course correction of the lower courts’ work in the foreign affairs context
will be forthcoming.109
101. Zivotofsky ex rel. v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196–97 (2012).
102. See id. at 196 (emphasizing that federal courts were not asked to substitute the
foreign policy decisions of any branch of government with that of the judiciary). Indeed,
in Zivotofsky II, the Court determined that the President’s authority to recognize foreign
powers is exclusive, a holding that reinforces a hands-off approach going forward. See
Zivotofsky ex rel. v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2087 (2015).
103. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
104. See id. at 1860–61 (cautioning against judicial interference in contexts
involving executive “formulation and implementation” of foreign policy).
105. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
106. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1861; see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981)
(“Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper
subjects for judicial intervention.”).
107. The majority’s reasoning in Ziglar clearly resonates with the language used by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Goldwater. Compare id. at 1861 (declining to “interfere in an intrusive
way with sensitive functions of the Executive Branch”), with Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996, 1005 n.2 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (prohibiting state court
resolution of questions that “trench upon exclusively federal questions of foreign policy”).
108. See Developments in the Law–Access to Courts: The Political Question Doctrine, Executive
Deference, and Foreign Relations, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1193 (2009) (observing that the
Court has erected numerous obstacles to prevent suits in the foreign relations context).
109. See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1861, 1863 (reiterating that “[n]ational-security policy
is the prerogative of the Congress and President” and holding that, in such cases, it is
proper to exercise restraint).
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CONCLUSION
Professor Harrison’s argument is both interesting and intentionally
provocative. He looks at what the Supreme Court has actually done
and demonstrates that the Court has acted in an orderly, even
predictable, way. The Court’s many statements that contradict this
orderly approach, though, suggest that this semblance of order may be
unintentional,110 and in the foreign affairs context, there is reason to
be wary that the Court will be willing to entertain a robust judicial
role.111 Professor Harrison’s argument draws its primary normative
conclusions from what the Court has actually done to date. Nothing
the Court has said, though, seems to preclude it from taking us in
another direction in the next case.

110. See supra Section II.
111. See supra notes 101–109 and accompanying text.

